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Abstract: The theory of liquidity management under uncertainty predicts
that, under certain conditions, commercial banks will accumulate minimum
reserve requirements linearly over the reserve maintenance period. This pre-
diction is empirically tested using daily data (from March 2004 until Febru-
ary 2007) on the current accounts and minimum reserve requirements of a
panel of 79 commercial banks from the euro area. The linear accumulation
hypothesis is not rejected by the data with the exception of small banks
which build-up excess reserves. The empirical analysis suggest that idio-
syncratic liquidity uncertainty is much higher than aggregate liquidity un-
certainty. Nevertheless, on the penultimate day in the reserve maintenance
period, the inverse demand schedule of the representative bank is relatively
￿at around the middle of the interest rate corridor set by the standing fa-
cilities. This suggests that liquidity e⁄ects on the overnight inter-bank rate
should be very muted on this day. Our calibration exercise suggests that
the probability of an individual bank￿s daily overdraft in the euro area is
very low (less than 1:0%). This is con￿rmed by the analysis of the daily
recourses to the marginal lending facility by the panel banks.
JEL classi￿cation: C23; E4; E5; G2.
Keywords: Monetary policy implementation; Reserve requirements; Rate
corridor; Liquidity management; Panel data.5
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Executive Summary
We consider an environment where monetary policy is implemented by steer-
ing an overnight interest rate within a corridor and banks have to comply
with minimum reserve requirements on average over a maintenance period.
The theory of liquidity management under uncertainty predicts that under
the joint hypothesis of symmetry of the interest rate corridor set by the
standing facilities around the target rate, and unbiased supply of liquidity
by the central bank, commercial banks will accumulate minimum reserve
requirements linearly over the reserve maintenance period. This prediction
is empirically tested using daily data (from March 2004 until February 2007)
on the current accounts and minimum reserve requirements of a panel of 79
commercial banks from the euro area. The linear accumulation hypothesis
is not rejected by the data with the exception of small banks which build-up
excess reserves. In addition, we calculate for the representative commercial
bank in the euro area two liquidity uncertainty ratios: ￿rst, the ratio of
idiosyncratic liquidity uncertainty over the individual minimum reserve re-
quirement, and second, the ratio of idiosyncratic liquidity uncertainty over
the aggregate liquidity uncertainty. Using these ratios we calibrate the the-
oretical model and make predictions about the frequency of recourses to the
marginal lending facility by commercial banks. The latter are cross-checked
against direct data on daily recourses to the marginal lending facility by
the banks in the panel. Both exercises suggest that the probability of an
individual bank￿s daily overdraft in the euro area is very low throughout
the reserve maintenance period (about 0:5%). The empirical analysis sug-
gests that idiosyncratic liquidity uncertainty is much higher than aggregate
liquidity uncertainty. On the penultimate day in the reserve maintenance
period, the inverse demand schedule of the representative bank is relatively
￿at around the middle of the interest rate corridor set by the standing fa-
cilities. This suggests that liquidity e⁄ects on the overnight inter-bank rate
should be very muted on this day. Thus, the martingale hypothesis should
be veri￿ed as a good approximation.6
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1. Introduction
Since the start of European Monetary Union, in January 1999, the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) has been providing its weekly re￿nancing to the
euro area banking system based on the concept of benchmark allotment.1
The benchmark allotment is de￿ned by the ECB as the allotment amount
which allows counterparties to smoothly ful￿l their reserve requirements un-
til the day before the settlement of the next main re￿nancing operation
(MRO), when taking into account the aggregate liquidity need of the bank-
ing system.2 In practice, this means that the ECB has been following very
closely a linear liquidity supply policy, which has the bene￿t of transparency
and simplicity. One open question is whether this policy matches the inter-
temporal preferences of commercial banks in the euro area.3 In fact, unless
commercial banks prefer to accumulate reserve requirements linearly over
time, there might be a mismatch between the demand and the supply of
liquidity putting pressure on, and increasing the volatility of the overnight
interest rate.
In order to shed some light into this question, we survey what the liquid-
ity management theory predicts about the optimal reserve ful￿lment path
of a commercial bank and empirically test its main implication using panel
data. To our best knowledge this is the ￿rst paper to tackle this issue em-
pirically. The theoretical background is based on William Poole￿s model of
commercial banks reserve management under uncertainty (Poole, 1968). In
fact, the theory predicts linear accumulation of minimum reserve require-
1For information on the operational framework for monetary policy implementation of
the Eurosystem see ECB (2006) downloadable from www.ecb.int.
2The aggregate liquidity need is calculated as the sum of: i) accumulated deviation
from a smooth reserve ful￿lment path that occurred previously in the same reserve main-
tenance period, either as a result of liquidity forecast errors, recourse to standing facilities
or allotment amounts being di⁄erent from the benchmark; ii) ECB￿s forecast of the au-
tonomous factors; iii) ECB￿s forecast of excess reserves, which are assumed to be the same
on each day of the reserve maintenance period; iv) the reserve requirement. The same con-
cept has been used to calibrate the ￿ne-tuning operations at the end of the maintenance
periods (see ECB, 2002).
3As of 31 May 2007, 6150 credit institutions were subject to minimum reserve require-
ments in the euro area. On 14 May 2007, reserve requirements amounted to EUR 182.2
billion.7
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ments under the joint hypothesis of symmetry of the interest rate corridor
set by the standing facilities of, and unbiased supply of liquidity by the ECB.4
This prediction of the model is tested using a panel of daily data (from
March 2004 until February 2007) on the current accounts of 79 selected
commercial banks from the euro area. The data was collected by National
Central Banks (NCB) of the Eurosystem in the context of a Monetary Op-
erations Committee (MOC) reporting exercise, which reviews the behaviour
of Eurosystem￿s counterparties. This data set has high quality allowing us
to test the linear reserve ful￿lment path hypothesis, which is equivalent to
testing the liquidity management model over a dimension so far not explored
in the literature.
In addition, we calculate for the representative commercial bank in the
euro area two liquidity uncertainty ratios: one is the ratio of idiosyncratic
liquidity uncertainty over the individual minimum reserve requirement, and
the other is the ratio of idiosyncratic liquidity uncertainty over the aggregate
liquidity uncertainty. Using these ratios to calibrate the theoretical model
predictions about the frequency of recourses to the marginal lending facility
by commercial banks can be made. The latter are cross-checked against
actual, direct data on daily recourses to the marginal lending facility made
by the banks in the panel. Both exercises suggest that the probability of
an individual bank￿s daily overdraft in the euro area is very low throughout
the reserve maintenance period (less than 1:0%).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 surveys the
theory and its main empirical predictions. Section 3 explains the economet-
ric methodology and Section 4 presents the data and the empirical results.
The calibration of the model is presented and discussed in Section 5. Section
6 concludes.
2. Theoretical background
The daily problem faced by the liquidity manager of a commercial bank,
4This prediction is transparent when the dynamic version of William Poole￿s model
is explicitly solved for a two-day maintenance period (see V￿lim￿ki (2003) and Whitesell
(2006)) rather than simulated as in Gaspar, V. et. al. (2007) and Quir￿s and MendizÆbal
(2006).8
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taking into account the main features of the Eurosystem￿s operational frame-
work for monetary policy implementation, has been formalized by V￿lim￿ki
(2003), Quir￿s and MendizÆbal (2006) and Gaspar et. al. (2007), using
a dynamic version of the Poole (1968) model. Here we provide an outline
of the model following the presentation in Whitesell (2006) in order to ex-
plicitly derive the testable implication of the theory (for a similar approach
see also V￿lim￿ki, 2003). The standard and well-known implication of the
model is that in an operational framework for monetary policy implemen-
tation based on an interest rate corridor with reserve requirements, higher
volatility of the overnight interest rate should be observed towards the end
of the reserve maintenance period. In this paper, instead, we focus on the
conditions under which a linear reserve ful￿lment path is optimal from the
point of view of an individual commercial bank.
The commercial bank￿s liquidity manager has to monitor the bank￿s daily
account at the central bank (at) complying with a no-overdraft constraint
(at ￿ 0). Borrowing in the interbank market is motivated with the view
of o⁄setting end-of-day idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (after the interbank
market is closed), and the need to ful￿l a reserve requirement (2R) on average
over a maintenance period of 2 days (t = T   1;T). The central bank
provides the aggregate liquidity need which is R each day. The individual
bank seeks to minimize the cost of funds. Two sources of funds are available:
overnight interbank borrowing at rate it and central bank funding (marginal
lending at rate il = i￿ +s). Banks can accumulate reserves on a daily basis.
However, given a no-overdraft constraint banks cannot de-cumulate reserves.
If cumulated current accounts exceed the reserve requirement the bank ful￿ls
its reserve requirement ahead of the end of the maintenance period and is
said to be ￿locked-in￿. If the account at the central bank exceeds what is
needed for the ful￿lment of the reserve requirement (excess reserves) the
surplus will be remunerated at the deposit facility rate (id = i￿   s). The
central bank sets the interest rates on its standing facilities symmetrically
(￿s) around its target rate (i￿).
In the main text technical details are kept to a minimum. For further
information on the formalization of the cost minimization problem, and9
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proofs of the propositions the reader is referred to the Annex.
Last day of the reserve maintenance period
The model must be solved in a recursive way starting from the last day
of the maintenance period (day T). The bank chooses its target account
balance at the central bank (aT) with the following information set: IT = {i￿,
s, iT, the distribution of the account balance shock, G("), and E(") = 0}.




il ￿ id (1)
or,
a￿






Equation (2) formalises the intuitive result that an individual bank￿s
borrowing in the interbank market is declining in the level of the market
interest rate (iT), and increasing with the level of its reserve de￿ciency (dT).
Note that a￿
T = b￿
T +aT 1, where b￿
T is optimal inter-bank borrowing by the
bank.
Proposition I. If the overnight interest rate is expected to be in the middle
of the corridor set by the rates of the standing facilities; and if the distrib-
ution of the liquidity shock is symmetric, the commercial bank will not
target excess reserves.
a￿
T = dT (3)
The bank will borrow/target on the last day of the maintenance period
exactly what it needs to satisfy the remaining part of the reserve require-
ment.
For further reference note that the ￿rst order condition can be re-written
as follows:
iT = il:G(dT ￿ a￿
T) + id:[1 ￿ G(dT ￿ a￿
T)] (4)
Penultimate day of the reserve maintenance period10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 869
February 2008
On the penultimate day of the reserve maintenance period (T ￿ 1), the
commercial bank chooses its target account balance at the central bank
(aT￿1) with the following information set: IT￿1 = {i￿, s, iT￿1, the distrib-
ution of the account balance shocks on the penultimate and last days, F(￿),
and G("), respectively, with E(￿) = E(") = 0}. The bank does not have
information on iT and dT. With a daily average requirement of R and end-




> > > > <
> > > > :
2R for aT￿1 + ￿ ￿ 0
2R ￿ aT￿1 ￿ ￿ for 0 < aT￿1 + ￿ < 2R
0 for aT￿1 + ￿ ￿ 2R
(5)
In this case the optimal behaviour of the bank is slightly more compli-








+ [F(2R ￿ a￿
T￿1) ￿ F(￿a￿
T￿1)]:ET￿1(iT)
where, ET￿1(iT) denotes the expectation of the overnight rate level for day
T with information available on the penultimate day in the maintenance
period. Compared to equation (4) there are two new terms in equation (6),
the ￿rst and the third. Apart from the (potential) di⁄erence between the
distribution of shocks in the two days, the di⁄erence between the ￿rst term
in equation (6) and the ￿rst term in equation (4) is the exclusion of the
reserve de￿ciency from the argument in the probability of taking recourse
to marginal lending; this is due to the fact that on the penultimate day of the
maintenance period the reserve requirement is not yet a binding constraint
as ful￿lment can be delayed by one day. The last term is the most important
as it links the level of the market rate at T ￿ 1 to its expected level on the
last day of the maintenance period (T).
Proposition II. Suppose the interest rate is in the middle of the corridor
on day T ￿1, and is expected to remain there on day T; if the distribution of
the liquidity shocks, G(") and F(￿); are symmetric, the commercial bank11
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will target the daily reserve requirement.
a￿
T 1 = R: (7)
Corollary. The bank targets the average daily reserve requirement as re-
serve de￿ciency for the last day.
d￿
T = R: (8)
Equation (7), equation (8) and equation (3) lead to the prediction that
the representative bank will optimally target a linear path for the ful￿lment
of the reserve requirement.
If the probability of an individual bank taking recourse to either standing
facility on the penultimate day is low, equation (6) implies:
iT 1 ￿ ET 1(iT): (9)
Under these conditions, the overnight interest rate on the penultimate
day of the reserve maintenance period will be approximately equal to the
level expected for the last day, which is the martingale hypothesis.
In theory, and from the point of view of the individual bank, the mar-
tingale hypothesis hinges on whether, in equation (6), the term [F(2R  
a￿
T 1)   F( a￿
T 1)], is close to 1. This should be the case when the proba-
bility of a daily overdraft and the probability of a bank locking-in are both
very low.
Aggregate demand and liquidity uncertainty ratios
Consider normally and independently distributed individual liquidity






j;T = N:￿":￿ 1
￿
iT   id
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where ￿(:) is the standardized normal distribution and ￿" is the standard
error of the liquidity shock. Market clearing is obtained by setting aggregate





















The interpretation of equation (12) is that the overnight interest rate on
the last day of the maintenance period is equal to the probability weighted
cost of using the standing facilities. If the central bank supplies the daily
liquidity requirement without error, S = N:R, the overnight interest rate will
be on target on the last day of the maintenance period, iT = i￿. In general,
the central bank cannot supply liquidity with full certainty and an aggregate
liquidity shock (error) will be observed (S +uT, uT 6= 0; E(uT) = 0). Thus,
the volatility of the overnight interest rate will depend not only on the
ratio of the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock over the reserve
requirement (￿"=R) but also on its ratio over the standard deviation of
the central bank liquidity supply error (￿"=￿u). We denote these ratios as
liquidity uncertainty ratios.
3. Econometric methodology
The theoretical model makes several empirical predictions two of which
have been tested by Gaspar et al. (2007) and Quir￿s and MendizÆbal (2006):
￿rstly, that the volatility of the overnight interest rate increases towards the
end of the maintenance period; and secondly, that individual recourses to
standing facilities increase as the end of the maintenance period approaches.
In fact, euro area data closely matches these predictions. Regarding the mar-
tingale hypothesis the evidence is mixed: whereas in Quir￿s and MendizÆbal
(2006) simulations suggest that a slight upward trend in the overnight rate
within the maintenance period should be expected, more recently Gaspar
et al. (2007) show that the martingale hypothesis is not rejected by euro13
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area data after the implementation, in March 2004, of the reform of the
Eurosystem￿s operational framework.5
Testing whether the panel is representative of the euro area commercial
banks
With data on the daily current accounts of individual banks we can test
for the linearity of the reserve ful￿lment path at the individual bank level.
The theoretical framework suggests a strategy for econometric modelling.
Consider the last two days in the reserve maintenance period (T ￿ 1; T).
















R is the (scaled) deviation from target on the previous
day. Thus, the theoretical framework suggests modelling the ratio of a
bank￿s current account over its daily reserve requirement as a ￿rst order
autorregressive process. In a regression, aT=R = ￿￿ + ￿￿:(aT￿1=R) + "￿
T,
one should test the null hypothesis, b ￿￿ + b ￿￿ = 1:
In practice, some adjustment costs might prevent the bank from fully
correcting deviations of current accounts from target on a daily basis. There-










+ ￿j;t; with j = 1;:::;N and t = 1;:::;T; (14)















where: j is an index for the individual bank where N is the number of
banks in the panel; t is an index for time and T is the number of time
series observations in the sample; ￿ is the ￿rst di⁄erence operator; aj;t is
the current account of bank j held at the central bank at time t (end-of-day;
after market trading); Rj;t is the daily average reserve requirement of bank
5On the reform of the operational framework of the Eurosystem see ECB (2003) and
ECB (2005).14
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j at time t; it is constant within each reserve maintenance period for each
bank and time varying across maintenance periods and banks; ￿=(1 ￿ ￿)
is the target daily current account at the central bank and (1 ￿ ￿) is the
adjustment coe¢cient.
Equation (15) states that if the current account is above the target the
treasurer of the bank will let the bank￿s account at the central bank run down
in proportion to the imbalance, measured by the second term in brackets on
the r.h.s. of equation (15).
The error term, ￿j;t = ￿j+#j;t, contains a ￿xed e⁄ect component (￿j) and
a stochastic component (#j;t). The ￿xed component groups banks by size
(large, medium and small) the idea being that the size of bank may a⁄ect
the ability and/or the resources invested in the management of liquidity. In
this context the main hypothesis to be tested, are as follows:
H1 - The daily current account target of the banks in the panel is the av-
erage daily reserve requirement; panel banks do not build up excess reserves
at the end of the maintenance period: ￿
1￿￿ = 1, or, equivalently, ￿ + ￿ = 1.
H2 - Banks in the panel attempt to restore their target within every
week (according to the regular re￿nancing by the ECB). With daily data
this implies 0:14 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1:
A smaller adjustment coe¢cient can be interpreted as greater willingness
to deviate from the linear path possibly (though not exclusively) for interest
rate arbitrage motive or due to adjustment costs.
The caveat of the hypothesis testing described above and, indeed, of
panel regressions like (14) and (15) is that they may not reveal anything
about individual bank￿s behaviour. Indeed, it can be argued that if the
panel is representative one should expect H1 and H2 not to be rejected,
not because of a speci￿c/optimal liquidity management style by commercial
banks, but simply because that is what the liquidity supply policy of the
ECB implies on average, over time, if a large cross section of banks is ob-
served. In this vein one may wish to interpret regressions (14) and (15) as
pre-testing whether the selected panel is representative.
Be that as it may, it should be emphasized that the total reserve re-
quirement of the banks included in our sample represented, on 1 January15
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2007, 42% of the total minimum reserve requirements in the euro area; thus,
the aggregate constraint implied by the linear liquidity supply of the ECB
does not constrain the banks in the panel to ful￿l their reserve requirement
linearly over time.
Testing the individual linear ful￿lment path hypothesis






= ￿ + ￿j;t; with j = 1;:::;N and t = T ￿ 1 or t = T, (16)
where: j is an index for the individual bank (N banks in the panel); t is an
index for time; it is either the penultimate day in the maintenance period,
T ￿ 1, or the last, T ; dj;t is the reserve de￿ciency of bank j on day t
(beginning-of-day; before market trading); Rj;t is the daily average reserve
requirement of bank j at time t. The error term, ￿j;t = ￿j + ￿j;t, contains
a ￿xed e⁄ect component (￿j) and a stochastic component (￿j;t). The ￿xed
component groups banks by size (large, medium and small).
In this context the main hypotheses to be tested, are as follows:
H3 - On the penultimate day in the maintenance period, banks tar-
get twice the daily average minimum reserve requirement for their reserve
de￿ciency: ￿ = 2; in equation (16) when t = T ￿ 1.
H4 - On the last day in the maintenance period, banks target the daily
average minimum reserve requirement for their reserve de￿ciency: ￿ = 1; in
equation (16) when t = T.
Note that H1 and H3 ￿ H4 are closely related. However, H3 ￿ H4
constitute a direct and stringent test on the individual linear accumulation
of reserves. In fact, the supply policy of the ECB implies neither H3 nor
H4, as on the last two days of the reserve maintenance period banks are free
to either frontload their reserve ful￿lment path ( ￿ < 1 for last day and/or
￿ < 2 for penultimate day); or backload it (￿ > 1 for last day and/or ￿ > 2
for penultimate day).
More generally, the linear accumulation of reserves, in the absence of
liquidity shocks, implies that the ratio of reserve de￿ciency over the daily16
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reserve requirement on any day to be equal to the distance until the end of
the maintenance period plus one:
dj;t=Rj;t = (T ￿ t) + 1: (17)
Calculating the liquidity uncertainty ratios
Panel data allows us to extract information about the uncertainty facing
individual institutions and estimate the ratio of aggregate versus idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty. If the hypothesis H1 and H2 are not rejected by the
data, the panel can be considered representative and the regression resid-
uals contain useful information: (i) about the idiosyncratic uncertainty in
relation to the individual bank￿s daily reserve requirement; and (ii) about
the ratio of aggregate uncertainty over idiosyncratic uncertainty. The liquid-
ity uncertainty ratios are key ingredients, necessary to realistically calibrate
any theoretical model of the inter-bank market. In the following we set out
a method for calculating these ratios.
The stochastic component in the error term of equation (14) has two
components, #j;t = #c
j;t + #
j
j;t. The ￿rst component is an aggregate shock,
#c
j;t, resulting from errors in the supply of (aggregate) liquidity by the central
bank. The other component is an idiosyncratic shock, #
j
j;t, which stems from
uncertainty about inter bank ￿ows of funds.
To identify the components we make two additional assumptions. The
￿rst assumption is that the average of the aggregate shock across banks, at






j;t 6= 0: (18)









j;t = 0: (19)
The second assumption is that the average of idiosyncratic shocks across17
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j;t = 0: (20)
Both error processes are assumed to be normally distributed. The ag-
gregate shock is assumed to be orthogonal to the idiosyncratic shocks and
uncorrelated over time. The idiosyncratic components are also assumed to
be orthogonal and uncorrelated over time. Similar assumptions are also
taken for the residuals ￿j;t.
To compute ￿#j (standard deviation of the idiosyncratic liquidity shock)
we procede in three steps: ￿rst, we generate series of idiosincratic liquidity
shocks for each bank (j) and each day (t), #
j




ond, we compute the standard deviations of the idiosyncratic shocks for each
bank (￿
j
#j), and third, we calculate the average of (￿
j
#j) across banks. To
compute ￿#c (standard deviation of the aggregate liquidity shock) we gener-





and compute the sample standard deviation.18
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4. Data and empirical results
The data set used in this study was collected by NCB in the context of
the preparation a Market Operations Committee (MOC) reporting exercise,
which regularly reviews the behaviour of Eurosystem￿s counterparties. The
choice of the institutions was at the discretion of NCB under the general
guidance that it should cover a sample of representative euro area commer-
cial banks (large, medium and small; EONIA panel banks and non EONIA
panel banks; eligible for ￿ne-tuning operations (FTO) and not eligible for
FTO). The original data set includes 85 commercial banks and covers the
period from January 2003 until 28 February 2007. It comprises daily in-
formation about individual bank￿s current accounts recourses to standing
facilities, excess reserves and reserve requirements. On 1 January 2007 the
total reserve requirement of the panel banks represented 42% of the total
euro area reserve requirements.
In order to work with a balanced panel and given the changes to the
operation framework for the implementation of monetary policy of the Eu-
rosystem, implemented in March 2004, the study covers only 79 banks and
the period from 10 March 2004 until 16 January 2007. Of the 6 banks ex-
cluded 3 are from Slovenia which joined the euro area only in January 2007,
and therefore could not be included in the econometric study. The panel has
a cross section dimension N = 79 much smaller than the time series dimen-
sion T = 1043 with a total of NxT = 82;397 observations for the estimation
of equation (14). However, given that the sample includes only 34 reserve
maintenance periods, the time series dimension is shorter than the cross
sectional dimension for the estimation of equations (16) (NxT = 2686).
Over the period from 10 March 2004 until 16 January 2007 the panel
euro area banks complied with a minimum reserve requirement of about
EUR 770 million (daily average reserve requirement per bank). The average
reserve requirement increased smoothly over time from EUR 668 million to
just over EUR 900 million. The population of banks in the sample is very
heterogeneous from the perspective of the size of their minimum reserve
requirement (see Figure 1): 5 banks had daily average minimum reserve
requirement, on average, below EUR 5.5 million; 18 banks had daily av-19
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erage minimum reserve requirement, on average, between EUR 5.5 million
and EUR 60 million; 26 banks between 60 million and 700 million; and 30
banks between 700 million and 5 billion. The classi￿cation of banks into
large, medium, and small was at the discretion of the NCB; the resulting
classi￿cation turned out as follows: large banks are considered those with
a daily average reserve requirement above EUR 200 million (average in the
sample); and small banks are considered those with a daily average reserve
requirement below EUR 20 million (average in the sample); medium banks
are in between (see Figure 1).
In the econometric testing, besides using the full sample, three sub-
samples are considered broadly coinciding with the three years covered by
the sample: the ￿rst sub-sample runs from 10 March 2004 until 18 January
2005; the second sub-sample from 19 January 2005 until 17 January 2006,
and the third sub-sample from 18 January 2006 until 16 January 2007. The
three sub-samples roughly coincide with the timing of three di⁄erent liquidity
management policies by the ECB during the sample period: the ￿rst sub-
sample covers the period when the ECB did not systematically ￿ne-tune
on the last day of the reserve maintenance period; the second sub-sample
covers the period when the ECB did so with higher frequency; and the
third sub-sample includes the period when the ECB targeted a liquidity
draining operation at the end of the reserve maintenance period. Moreover,
in the three sub-samples, the ECB supplied liquidity either following the
benchmark rule (￿rst sub-sample) or provided slightly above benchmark
at all but the last MRO (second sub-sample); or provided slightly above
benchmark at all MRO (third sub-sample). In the latter case, the FTO on
the last day of the reserve maintenance period aimed at zero net recourse
to standing facilities. Splitting the econometric testing of hypothesis in
three sub-samples allows checking whether evidence of structural change is
emerging linked to the potential commercial bank￿s reaction to the slightly
di⁄erent liquidity management policies followed by the ECB.
Is the panel representative?
An overall perspective of the econometric results can be gauged by look-20
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ing at the cross-plot of the day in the maintenance period against the aver-
age, over banks, of the individual cumulated ratio of current account over






= t, for j = 1;:::;N. (21)
Figure 2 shows for each day in the reserve maintenance period the cross
sectional average of the cumulated ratio of current account over minimum
reserve requirement in each day of the reserve maintenance period (equation
(21)). Figure 3 shows the same variable calculated on the last day of each
reserve maintenance period. All data points are very close to the 45￿ line.
Figure 4 shows the daily cross section average of the ratio of the current
account over minimum reserve requirement. This variable moves around
one.
Statistical testing is reported in Table 1 (full sample) and Table 2 (sub-
samples). The dynamic panel was estimated using the Anderson and Hsiao
(1981) estimator as, given the large time dimension of the panel, the Arellano
and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is not feasible. The results are striking.
For the full sample, b ￿ + b ￿ = 1, and there does not seem to be any major
di⁄erence between large euro area banks (reference group) and medium or
small banks. The adjustment coe¢cient is large, 1 ￿ b ￿ ￿ 0:7, suggesting a
quick return to target current accounts (70% of deviation corrected within
one day). For the sub-samples, b ￿ + b ￿ = 1, but small banks seem to have
a somewhat higher target ratio than the other groups suggesting excess
reserves build-up by this group. The adjustment coe¢cient is still large,
1￿ b ￿ ￿ 0:7, but it seems to have declined slightly after the ECB enacted the
policy of more frequent ￿ne-tuning at the end of the reserve maintenance
period (2005-2007). The decline in the speed of adjustment to target current
accounts could have been the result of the ￿ne-tuning (or liquidity) policy
as it might have directly encouraged liquidity smoothing by commercial
banks or indirectly by reducing the average size of the liquidity imbalances.
Therefore, the econometric and graphical evidence strongly supports the
view that the panel is representative of euro area commercial banks and21
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that banks accumulate reserves linearly over time.
Do banks follow a linear ful￿lment path?
Figure 5 shows the cross sectional average (and the one-standard devi-
ation band) of the ratio of the reserve de￿ciency over the minimum reserve
requirement on the penultimate day of each reserve maintenance period.
Figure 6 shows the same variable calculated on the last day of each reserve
maintenance period. Data points are close to 2 and 1 respectively therefore
suggesting that the panel banks ful￿l their reserve requirement linearly over
time. Nevertheless, the linear reserve accumulation path seems to have been
followed more closely by banks after the ECB started the policy of frequent
￿ne-tuning (2005-2007).
Statistical testing is reported in Table 3 (full sample) and Table 4 (sub-
samples), for the last day in the maintenance period, and in Table 5 (full
sample) and Table 6 (sub-samples) for the penultimate day. The static
panels were estimated using the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV)
method. The results are striking. Large euro area banks target the daily
average reserve requirement as de￿ciency for the last day of the maintenance
period a result that strongly supports the linear ful￿lment path prediction.
The behaviour of medium size banks is not statistically di⁄erent from the
behaviour of large banks. However, small banks seem to frontload the reserve
ful￿lment path as they enter the last day of the maintenance period with a
reserve de￿ciency of just over 10% of the daily minimum reserve requirement
(dsmall
T = 0:11:R). This is consistent with small banks building-up excess
reserves. These results are con￿rmed for each of the sub-samples considered.
However, the small banks included in the sample reveal some convergence
towards the behaviour of the other groups as the speci￿c e⁄ect attached to
this group against the reference group (large banks) increased from -2.58 to
-0.83 (thus being closer to ratio 1).
Large euro area banks target twice the daily average reserve requirement
as de￿ciency for the penultimate day of the maintenance period a result that
again strongly supports the linear ful￿lment path prediction. Also in this
case the behaviour of medium size banks is not statistically di⁄erent from22
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the behaviour of large banks. Small banks frontload the reserve ful￿lment
path as they enter the penultimate day of the maintenance period with a
reserve de￿ciency of about 50% of the daily minimum reserve requirement
(dsmall
T = 0:50:R ). This is again consistent with small banks building-up
excess reserves. These results are con￿rmed for each of the sub-samples
considered with the small banks included in the sample revealing some con-
vergence towards the behaviour of the other groups as the speci￿c e⁄ect
attached to this group against the reference group (large banks) increased
from -2.55 to -0.86 (closer to ratio 2).
All in all, most euro area commercial banks included in the panel seem
to ful￿l their reserve requirements in a linear way therefore neither back-
nor frontloading the ful￿lment path. This is indeed the optimal behaviour
when the ECB is expected to supply liquidity without any bias and the
interest rate corridor is perceived as symmetric. Nevertheless, some het-
erogeneity is noted with small banks in the sample revealing frontloading
behaviour and/or the building up of excess reserves, consistent with the idea
of less investment by these institutions in liquidity management technology
or resources. This may well be the optimal choice when the requirement to
be ful￿lled is small, given the high costs of monitoring end-of-day current
accounts at NCB and of non-compliance (see Bindseil et al. (2006)).
How important is the idiosyncratic liquidity shock?
The ratio of idiosyncratic over aggregate uncertainty (￿#j=￿#c) calcu-
lated as explained in Section 3, is about 6, suggesting that commercial banks
in the euro area face idiosyncratic liquidity uncertainty several times higher
than aggregate liquidity uncertainty. The standard deviations of the shocks
are ￿#c = 0:1, and ￿#j = 0:6. These values are used as a basis for calibrating
the theoretical model.
However, to calibrate the individual demand schedules, we can use ad-
ditional information on the daily recourses to marginal lending by the panel
banks. In the full sample, the probability that a bank takes recourse to mar-
ginal lending, on any day in the maintenance period is 0:5% (429 recourses in
a total of 82,397 observations). Most of the recourses occur on the last day23
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of the reserve maintenance period; but there is some heterogeneity, among
the three groups of banks, on the frequency of daily recourses to marginal
lending. In fact, the probability that a large size bank takes recourse to mar-
ginal lending on the last day of the maintenance period is small (0:20%); the
probability that a large size bank takes recourse to marginal lending on the
other days is even smaller (0:05%). The probability that a medium size bank
takes recourse to marginal lending on the last day of the maintenance period
is negligible (0:03%); and the probability that a medium size bank takes re-
course to marginal lending on the other days is somewhat higher (0:22%).
Small size banks in the panel never took recourse to marginal lending, which
is coherent with this group building up excess reserves.6
Thus, in drawing the inverse demand schedules we used, ￿#j = 0:43;
instead of ￿#j = 0:60; which is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
shock that generates a 1% probability of individual recourse to marginal
lending on the penultimate day of the maintenance period, when the com-
mercial bank has a reserve requirement of EUR 1 billion and targets this
value for its daily current account. With these values we obtain a ratio,
￿#j=R < 0:5, implying that the martingale hypothesis is likely to be veri￿ed
in the simulation.
The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock obtained with informa-
tion from individual marginal lending is lower than the standard deviation
that is implied by the calculation of the liquidity uncertainty ratios. How-
ever, in the simulation exercise the di⁄erence is minor, as both standard
deviations imply ￿at inverse demand curves on the penultimate day of the
reserve maintenance period.
5. Calibration
Figure 7 shows the inverse demand schedules on the last two-days of
the reserve maintenance period for the representative (large) commercial
bank in the euro area assuming an individual daily reserve requirement of
EUR 1 billion. The curves show optimal borrowing for a given level of the
6The probabilities were estimated using a panel Logit model. Detailed results are
available from the author upon request.24
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overnight interest rate during the last two-days in the reserve maintenance
period, assuming that the rate expected to prevail on the last day is exactly
at the middle of the interest rate corridor (3% in Figure 7).
Two features of the (inverse) demand schedules are worth noting. Firstly,
on the penultimate day of the maintenance period the inverse demand sched-
ule is relatively ￿at - highly elastic - around the interest rate level expected
to prevail on the last day. Secondly, on the last day, the inverse demand
curve is much steeper.
For the simulation exercise we considered an interbank overnight market
composed of 150 homogeneous banks each having a reserve requirement
of EUR 1 billion. The probability of a daily overdraft with an aggregate
reserve requirement of EUR 150 billion is about 1%. We can assume that
this probability remains constant over the whole maintenance period. The
probability of locking-in should be zero at the beginning of the maintenance
period, staying low most of the time and increasing quickly as the last day of
the maintenance period approaches. Taking equation (6) as a rough guide
for the determination of the overnight interest rate on the ￿rst day of a
longer maintenance period, we should expect the overnight rate to start the
maintenance period at most 1 basis points above the minimum bid rate, if
it is expected to be at exactly the middle of the corridor on the last day
(0:01x4+0:99x3=3:01).
Figure 8 shows the empirical density of the deviation of EONIA from the
minimum bid rate on the penultimate day of the reserve maintenance period
for the full sample and for a sub-sample (after more frequent ￿ne-tuning by
the ECB). Figure 10 shows the empirical density of the deviation of EONIA
from minimum bid rate on the last day of the reserve maintenance period
for the full sample and for the sub-sample. Table 7 and Table 8 report the
respective normality tests.
We concentrate on the statistics for the sub-sample given that without a
￿ne-tuning operation on the last day of the maintenance period, one of the
basic assumptions of the model is violated. Statistics for the penultimate
day of the reserve maintenance period, in the sub-sample, show a positive
average deviation from the minimum bid rate of about 4 basis points; with a25
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standard deviation of 9 basis points the sample mean is statistically di⁄erent
from zero at the 5% con￿dence level (25 degrees of freedom). The empirical
distribution is close to normal. The results of the simulation are illustrated
in Figure 9. The simulated standard deviation of the overnight interest
rate is 10 times smaller than the sample standard deviation. This suggests
that the liquidity uncertainty ratio on the penultimate day is smaller than
6, the value used in the simulation. This may be due to higher aggregate
uncertainty. Commercial banks have to wait until the morning of the last
day of the maintenance period to learn whether the ECB will launch a
￿ne-tuning operation and whether the operation will be liquidity absorbing
or liquidity providing. To some extent, this could explain the higher than
calibrated aggregate uncertainty on the penultimate day of the maintenance
period.
The standard deviation of the aggregate shock chosen for the simulation
of the last day is 6 times smaller than the standard deviation of the idio-
syncratic shock. The latter was ￿xed at 0:43 as explained. It is interesting
to note that the statistics for the last day of the maintenance period show a
deviation from the minimum bid rate at zero (in the sub-sample) with stan-
dard deviation 0.13. These moment values are matched exactly by averaging
over 1,000 simulations of the theoretical model (see simulations in Figure
11). The calibrated model can be used to simulate the e⁄ects of changes to
the operational framework, like a reduction in the reserve ratio or a change
in the width of the interest rate corridor set by the standing facilities. This
however is outside the scope of this paper and is left for future work.26
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6. Conclusions
In this paper we inquired into the reserve ful￿lment path of a represen-
tative panel of euro area commercial banks. The empirical analysis con￿rms
the theoretical prediction that banks optimally target their daily current
account with the central bank at around their respective minimum reserve
requirement. The exception seems to be small banks which build-up excess
reserves.
The empirical analysis suggests that idiosyncratic liquidity uncertainty
is much higher than aggregate uncertainty. Nevertheless, the inverse de-
mand schedule of the representative bank, on the penultimate day of the
reserve maintenance period is relatively ￿at around the middle of the inter-
est rate corridor set by the rates on the standing facilities. This suggests
that, except on the last day, liquidity e⁄ects should be very muted within
the maintenance period in the euro area. Indeed, the probability of an indi-
vidual bank￿s daily overdraft in the euro area seems to be very low (below
1%).
Our results have several policy implications. Firstly, the benchmark al-
lotment policy followed by the ECB is fully consistent with individual com-
mercial bank￿s optimality in a model where the ECB is expected to supply
liquidity without any bias and steer very-short term money market rates
whithin a symmetric interest rate corridor. Secondly, one component of the
benchmark allotment is the forecast of excess reserves. According to the
theoretical model presented in this paper, there is no rationale for banks
to systematically take recourse to the deposit facility (or build up excess
reserves) on the last day of the maintenance period. Nevertheless, the em-
pirical evidence shows that small banks build-up excess reserves; this het-
erogeneity in market behaviour complicates, somewhat, the ECB￿s task of
calibrating the aggregate liquidity supply.27
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Annex
1. Cost minimization problem on the last day of the maintenance
period
On the last day of the reserve maintenance period the cost minimization
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￿
:(dT   aT   "):dG(")g
The ￿rst term is the cost of borrowing from the market to meet the
remaining reserve requirement, named reserve de￿ciency (dT). The ￿rst
integral is the opportunity cost of holding excess balances (for aT  dT +" >
0); the second integral is the cost of borrowing from the central bank rather
than from the market, to meet the reserve requirement (for aT  dT +" < 0).
2. Proof of Proposition I:
By setting iT = il   (il   id)=2 in equation (2) we get G 1 (0:5); with
symmetric probability distribution, G("); and E (") = 0; G 1 (0:5) = 0:
The result follows immediately.
3. Cost minimization problem on the penultimate day of the main-
tenance period
To derive the ￿rst order conditions of optimality note that, dT   a￿
T, is
independent of dT (see Whitesell, 2006).
dT   a￿
T = G
￿
iT   id
il   id
￿
= k(iT;i￿;s;G): (23)
Using the optimality condition( 2) to replace a￿
T in equation (22) we
obtain the expected cost function, V (a￿
TjIT); on day T   1:
V (a￿
TjIT) = iT:dT + K(iT;i￿;s;G) (24)30
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The cost minimization problem of the representative bank on the penul-
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T)]:
4. Proof of Propostion II:
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￿




+ [F(2R   a￿







If F(￿) is symmetric and E(￿) = 0 then (27) simpli￿es to:
1   F( a￿
T 1) = F(2R   a￿
T 1) (28)
which implies the statement in the proposition.
5. Proof of Corollary:
It follows directly from Proposition I and the de￿nition of de￿ciency
dT = 2R   aT 1:31
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Tables:
Table 1: Testing whether the panel is representative (full sample)
RATIO OF DAILY CURRENT ACCOUNT OVER DAILY AVERAGE MINIMUM
RESERVE REQUIREMENT (FULL SAMPLE)
Model I Model II
(With SIZE)








! ˆ 1" 0.73 0.65





t – Statistics are in parentheses.
* * Statistically significant at 10% level
* ** * Statistically significant at 5% level
* ** ** * Statistically significant at 1% level32
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Table 2: Testing whether the panel is representative (sub-samples)
RATIO OF DAILY CURRENT ACCOUNT OVER DAILY AVERAGE MINIMUM
RESERVE REQUIREMENT (FOR THREE SUB – SAMPLES)
Sub-sample I
(Mar.10 04
– Jan. 18 05)
Sub-sample II
(Jan. 19 05
- Jan. 17 06)
Sub-sample III
(Jan. 18 06
- Jan. 16 07)












! ˆ 1" 0.74 0.67 0.65













t – Statistics are in parentheses.
* * Statistically significant at 10% level
* ** * Statistically significant at 5% level
* ** ** * Statistically significant at 1% level33
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Table 3: Testing the linear fulfilment path hypothesis on last day of reserve maintenance
period (full sample)
RATIO OF RESERVE DEFICIENCY OVER AVERAGE DAILY MINIMUM RESERVE
REQUIREMENT ON LAST DAY FOR EACH RESERVE MAINTENANCE PERIOD
(FULL SAMPLE)
Coefficient Standard Error t-statistics
 
 
1.03990 *** 0.08949 19.62
i MEDIUM -0.18595 0.16166 -1.15
i SMALL -1.153123*** 0.16813 -9.11
* * Statistically significant at 10% level
* ** * Statistically significant at 5% level
* ** ** * Statistically significant at 1% level
Table 4: Testing the linear fulfilment path hypothesis on last day of reserve maintenance
period (sub-samples)
RATIO OF RESERVE DEFICIENCY OVER AVERAGE DAILY MINIMUM RESERVE
REQUIREMENT ON LAST DAY FOR EACH RESERVE MAINTENANCE PERIOD
(THREE SUB – SAMPLES)
Sub-sample I
(Mar.10 04
– Jan. 18 05)
Sub-sample II
(Jan. 19 05
- Jan. 17 06)
Sub-sample III
(Jan. 18 06
- Jan. 16 07)
 


















t – Statistics are in parentheses.
* * Statistically significant at 10% level
* ** * Statistically significant at 5% level
* ** ** * Statistically significant at 1% level
For the three sub-samples, we accept 0: 1 H Intercept ! with p-values 0.8445, 0.7350 and
0.5985 respectively34
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Table 5: Testing the linear fulfilment path hypothesis on penultimate day of reserve
maintenance period (full sample)
RATIO OF RESERVE DEFICIENCY OVER AVERAGE DAILY MINIMUM RESERVE
REQUIREMENT ON THE PENULTIMATE DAY OF RESERVE MAINTENANCE
PERIOD
(FULL SAMPLE )
Coefficient Standard Error t-statistics
 
 
2.03695 *** 0.09559 21.31
i MEDIUM -0.07775 0.17268 -0.45
i SMALL -1.50820 *** 0.17959 -8.40
* * Statistically significant at 10% level
* ** * Statistically significant at 5% level
* ** ** * Statistically significant at 1% level
Table 6: Testing the linear fulfilment path hypothesis on penultimate day of reserve
maintenance period (sub-samples)
RATIO OF RESERVE DEFICIENCY OVER AVERAGE DAILY MINIMUM RESERVE





– Jan. 18 05)
Sub-sample II
(Jan. 19 05
- Jan. 17 06)
Sub-sample III
(Jan. 18 06
- Jan. 16 07)
 


















t – Statistics are in parentheses.
* * Statistically significant at 10% level
* ** * Statistically significant at 5% level
* ** ** * Statistically significant at 1% level
For the three sub-sample, we accept 0: 2 H Intercept ! with p-values 0.8991, 0.7211 and
0.7001 respectively35
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Table 7: Normality tests for the penultimate day of the maintenance period
Normality test for EONIA-MBR over the
full sample 06/04/2004 – 16/01/2007
Normality test for EONIA-MBR over the








Asymptotic test: Chi^2(2) = 0.11033
[0.9463]








Asymptotic test: Chi^2(2) = 0.96555
[0.6171]
Normality test: Chi^2(2) = 3.3275 [0.1894]
Table 8: Normality tests for the last day of the maintenance period
Normality test for EONIA-MBR over the
full sample 06/04/2004 – 16/01/2007
Normality test for EONIA-MBR over the








Asymptotic test: Chi^2(2) = 22.497
[0.0000]**









Asymptotic test: Chi^2(2) = 6.1038
[0.0473]*
Normality test: Chi^2(2) = 5.7633 [0.0560]36
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Figures:
Figure 1: Histogram of the panel of euro area banks
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Figure 2: Cumulated ratio of current account over minimum reserve requirement: average across
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Figure 3: Cumulated ratio of current account over minimum reserve requirement: average across
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Figure 4: Ratio of current account over minimum reserve requirement: daily average across banks
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Figure 5: Ratio of reserve deficiency over minimum reserve requirement on the penultimate day of
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Figure 7: Demand schedules on the last 2-days of the maintenance period calibrated for the
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Figure 8: Deviation of EONIA from minimum bid rate on penultimate day of reserve maintenance
period





FULLSAMPLE: 06/04/2004 - 16/01/2007
SUB-SAMPLE: 18/01/2005 - 16/01/2007
EONIA_MBR_T-1 N(s=0.114)





Figure 9: Simulated deviation of the overnight rate from the minimum bid rate (middle of the
corridor set by standing facilities) on the penultimate day in the reserve maintenance period
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Figure 10: Deviation of EONIA from minimum bid rate on last day of reserve maintenance period




FULLSAMPLE: 06/04/2004 - 16/01/2007
EONIA_MBR N(s=0.232)






SUB-SAMPLE: 18/01/2005 - 16/01/2007
EONIA_MBR N(s=0.127)
Figure 11: Simulated deviation of the overnight rate from the minimum bid rate (middle of the
corridor set by standing facilities) on the last day in the reserve maintenance period
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